ACM SIGKDD 2023 Tutorial on

Trustworthy Machine Learning:
Robustness, Generalization, and Interpretability

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https://mltrust.github.io/

Contents and speakers

Overview of trustworthiness (Jindong Wang, 10min)

Robust machine learning (Jindong Wang, 40min)

Out-of-distribution generalization (Haohan Wang, 40min)

Interpretability (Haohan Wang, 40min)

Trustworthiness in the era of large models (Jindong Wang, 40min)

Overview of trustworthiness

The "Clever Hans" story

- In late 1900s, there is a horse that can
  - read, do arithmetic, listen to music, and distinguish colors



A brilliant horse?

Regular response to his master

Prompt injection for ChatGPT



https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.15043

Machine learning

- How *reliable* are the predictions?
- How *robust* are models to new data?
- How *secure* to malicious users?
- How can you learn from *limited* data?
- …

Data

……

CNN
Transformer
RNN
…

Model

Output

3

Cat



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What is trustworthy ML?



Are current AI models trustworthy?

ChatGPT plugins face 'prompt injection' risk from third-parties

Third-parties have the potential to take over your ChatGPT requests.

By Matt Binder on May 27, 2023

TESLA AUTOPILOT —

Researchers trick Tesla Autopilot into steering into oncoming traffic

Stickers that are invisible to drivers and fool autopilot.

DAN GOODIN - 4/2/2019, 8:50 AM



Home / Innovation / Artificial Intelligence

Google's image recognition AI fooled by new tricks



Chinese messaging app error sees n-word used in translation

WeChat is blaming machine learning for erroneously converting a neutral phrase meaning 'black foreigner' into something far more offensive

Incident 213 5 Reports

Facebook's Political Ad Detection Reportedly Showed High and Geographically Uneven Error Rates

2020-07-01

The performance of Facebook's political ad detection was revealed by researchers to be imprecise, uneven across countries in errors, and inadequate for preventing systematic violations of political advertising policies.

09-28-18

Alexa can be hacked–by chirping birds

Researchers were able to attack a common speech recognition system using voice commands hidden in other audio recordings.

https://incidentdatabase.ai/entities/facebook/
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/04/researchers-trick-tesla-autopilot-into-steering-into-oncoming-traffic/
https://www.zdnet.com/article/googles-best-image-recognition-system-flummoxed-by-fakes/
https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20220724A00GAT00
https://www.fastcompany.com/90240975/alexa-can-be-hacked-by-chirping-birds
https://mashable.com/article/beware-chatgpt-ai-prompt-injections

Adversarial robustness

- Adversarial examples
  - Adversarial examples can easily fool the system
  - Robustness is the model’s ability to withheld being fooled



Generalization

- Out-of-distribution generalization
  - Models should have the ability to generalize to unseen samples

"Current systems are not as robust to changes in distribution as humans, who can quickly adapt to such changes with very few examples"

Yoshua Bengio,
Geoffrey Hinton,
Yann Lecun
Deep learning for AI
Com. ACM 2021



ImageNet   CIFAR-100

Source Domain $\sim P_S(X,Y)$ $\neq$ Target Domain $\sim P_T(Z,H)$

lots of **labeled** data   unlabeled or limited labels

$D_S = \{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i), \forall i \in \{1,\dots,N\}\}$ $D_T = \{(\mathbf{z}_j, ?), \forall j \in \{1,\dots,M\}\}$

Interpretability

- Making AI models explainable



Cunning 2019

Fairness

- Fairness
  - The ability to perform equally well for different groups





Privacy

- Performs well at no cost of privacy leakage





Figure 1: **Our extraction attack.** Given query access to a neural network language model, we extract an individual person's name, email address, phone number, fax number, and physical address. The example in this figure shows information that is all accurate so we redact it to protect privacy.

Carlini N, Tramer F, Wallace E, et al. Extracting training data from large language models. USENIX Security 21.

Trustworthiness in the era of large models

- A world dominated by large models





Why do we care?

A better understanding of ML models and algorithms

- The advantages and limitations of existing ML algorithms
- Build better algorithms

Better security control and risk management

- 90% of ML problems are not about trustworthiness, but the remaining 10% will irreversibly destroy everything

Better co-existence of humans-AI

- Making AI more responsible
- Security management and risk control

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Robust machine learning

Jindong Wang
Microsoft Research



A holistic roadmap to robustness

- Given a model, robustness is from the *data* level
  - **Data quality**:
    - *Adversarial examples*: Resilience to impercetible perturbations



$$\min_{f\in\mathcal{H}} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\in\mathcal{D}} \max_{|\delta|\le\epsilon} \ell[f(\mathbf{x}+\delta), y]$$

Adversarial attack

  - **Data quantity**:
    - *Limited downstream data*: stability to very limited training data



$$\frac{1}{\mu B}\sum_{b=1}^{\mu B} \mathbb{1}(\max(p_m(y|\omega(u_b))) > \boxed{\tau})\, H(\hat{p}_m(y|\omega(u_b)), p_m(y|\Omega(u_b)))$$

Semi-supervised learning

- Goodfellow I J, Shlens J, Szegedy C. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples[J]. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
- Sohn K, Berthelot D, Carlini N, et al. Fixmatch: Simplifying semi-supervised learning with consistency and confidence[J]. Advances in neural information processing systems, 2020, 33: 596-608.

Data quality: adversarial attack

There are tons of tutorials on adversarial robustness. **What new in this one?**

Basics of adversarial attack (mostly on CNNs)

Emerging attacks: adv. examples in **transfer learning**

Modern adversarial robustness: Robust **Transformers**

The accuracy-robustness trade-off



Su et al., Is Robustness the Cost of Accuracy? A Comprehensive Study on the Robustness of 18 Deep Image Classification Models, ECCV 2018.

Attack settings: white and black-box attacks

Setting	Network	Output	BP?
White-box		Confidence scores	✓
Black-box with soft labels		Confidence scores	✗
Black-box with hard labels		Hard labels	✗

White-box attack

- A general view of attack operation

$$\mathbf{x}^* = \arg\min_{\mathbf{x}} \boxed{\mathrm{Dist}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_0)} + c \cdot \boxed{\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}, t)}$$

Distance between the original and the adversarial input

Loss function, usually use cross entropy or contrastive loss

ℓ_∞ distance: $\|\delta\|_\infty = \max_i |\delta_i|$ maximal pixel-wise distor

ℓ_2 distance: $\|\delta\|_2 = \sqrt{\sum_i \delta_i^2}$ Euclidean distance

ℓ_1 distance: $\|\delta\|_1 = \sum_i |\delta_i|$ total variation

- N. Carlini, D. Wagner. Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2017
- Chen et al. EAD: Elastic-Net Attacks to Deep Neural Networks via Adversarial Examples, AAAI 2018

Black-box attacks

- Setting: with soft labels
  - The attacker has no access to the network parameters and architecture
  - So, they can only query the network outputs to get probability outputs



Confidence scores

- Setting: with hard labels
  - They can only query the network outputs to get hard-label multi-class outputs



Hard label

Black-box attack with zeroth-order optimization

- The gradient cannot be computed in black-box setting

$$\mathbf{x}^* = \arg\min_{\mathbf{x}} \ \mathrm{Dist}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_0) + c \cdot \boxed{\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x})}$$

- How?
  - ZOO: approximate gradient by symmetric difference quotient to estimate the gradient:

$$\hat{g}_i \approx \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{x})}{\partial x_i} \approx \frac{\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{x} + \epsilon \boldsymbol{e}_i) - \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{x} - \epsilon \boldsymbol{e}_i)}{2\epsilon}$$

$$\boldsymbol{x} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{x} - \eta \begin{bmatrix} \hat{g}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \hat{g}_d \end{bmatrix}$$

  - However, need O(d) queries to estimate a gradient
    - ImageNet: d = 299*299*3 > 268K
    - 100 iterations => 26.8 million queries

- Chen et al., ZOO: Zeroth Order Optimization Based Black-box Attacks to Deep Neural Networks without Training Substitute Models. AISec@CCS 2017

Optimization-based hard-label attack

- Reformulate the attack optimization problem

$$\theta^* = \arg\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \; g(\boldsymbol{\theta})$$

$$\text{Untargeted attack: } g(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \texttt{argmin}_{\lambda>0}\left(f(\mathbf{x}_0 + \lambda\frac{\boldsymbol{\theta}}{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|}) \neq y_0\right)$$

$$\text{Targeted attack: } g(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \texttt{argmin}_{\lambda>0}\left(f(\mathbf{x}_0 + \lambda\frac{\boldsymbol{\theta}}{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|}) = t\right)$$



- Cannot compute the gradient of g
- However, can compute the function value of g via query
- Binary search + fine-grained search

θ: The direction of adversaria example

Emerging threats to transfer learning

- Attacks in transfer learning:



$$\tilde{x} = \arg\max_{x'} J(f(x'; \mathbf{w}^T), y) \quad \text{s.t. } d(x', x) < \epsilon$$

- The first K layers are copied from the teacher and fixed.
- The remaining N-K layers are fine-tuned.

Vulnerability of DNN models

- DNN models are not safe

✓ Adversarial attack: Obtain adversarial examples using adversarial training to fool the model [1]



✓ Backdoor attack: Hidden malicious logic is injected into the model purposely [2]



- Defect inheritance: *fine-tuning can't help*



Task		Defect Type	Inheritance Rate
CV	Adversarial Vulnerability	Penultimate-Layer Guided [51]	58.01%
		Neuron-Coverage Guided [21, 48]	52.58%
	Backdoor	Latent Data Poisoning [62]	72.91%
NLP	Adversarial Vulerability	Greedy Word Swap [31]	64.86%
		Word Importance Ranking [29]	94.73%
	Backdoor	Data Poisoning [20]	96.72%
		Weight Poisoning [32]	97.85%

52.58% to **97.85%** defect inheritance rate!

[1] https://towardsdatascience.com/adversarial-attacks-in-machine-learning-and-how-to-defend-against-them-a2beed95f49c
[2] Gu et al. BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain. arXiv 1708.06733.

Existing research

- Can transfer learning models be attacked? *Yes!*
  - Adversarial attack on transfer learning models [Wang et al.'18]
  - Generate salient features, then perturb the inputs [Ji et al.'18]
  - Softmax layer is easy to attack [Rezaei et al.'20]



- How to defend?
  - Train from scratch: best defense, worst performance
  - Fine-tune: worst defense, best performance
  - Fix-after-transfer
    - fine-tune, then use defense: expensive and poor effectiveness due to small data
  - Fix-before-transfer: randomly initialize the student, then extract teacher knowledge
    - Renofeation [Chin et al.'21]: add dropout, feature regularization, and stochastic weight average; not end-to-end

- [Wang et al.'18] Wang B, Yao Y, Viswanath B, et al. With great training comes great vulnerability: Practical attacks against transfer learning. USENIX Security'18.
- [Ji et al.'18] Ji Y, Zhang X, Ji S, et al. Model-reuse attacks on deep learning systems. CCS'18.
- [Rezaei et al.'20] Rezaei S, Liu X. A target-agnostic attack on deep models: Exploiting security vulnerabilities of transfer learning. ICLR'20.
- [Chin et al.'21] Chin et al. Renofeation: A Simple Transfer Learning Method for Improved Adversarial Robustness. CVPR'21 workshop.

ReMoS approach

- ReMoS: Relevant Model Slicing
  - Given a DNN model M and a target domain dataset D, ReMoS is to compute a <u>subset</u> of model <u>weights</u> that are more relevant (bounded by a threshold) to the inference of samples in D and less relevant to the samples outside D.





Zhang et al. ReMoS: reducing defect inheritance in transfer learning with relevant modelslicing. ICSE 2022.

ReMoS approach

- ReMoS
  - Coverage frequency profiling: compute coverage frequency of each weight → support of student task
  - Ordinal score computation: compute score of each weight based on teacher weight and coverage frequency
  - Relevant slice generation: identify the relevant weights
  - Fine-tuning: vanilla fine-tune



ReMoS approach

- Coverage frequency profiling
  - Neuron coverage: find the neuron whose activation value is large than a threshold α

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Cov}(x) &= \mathrm{Cov}(\ \mathrm{Run}(M, x)\ ) = \mathrm{Cov}(\{\mathbf{h}_1, \mathbf{h}_2, \cdots, \mathbf{h}_K\}) \\ &= \{\mathbf{v}_i | \mathbf{v}_i = \mathbb{I}[\mathbf{h}_i > \alpha]\}.\end{aligned}$$

  - On dataset D^S

$$\mathrm{Cov}(D^S) = \{\sum_{x \in D^S} \mathrm{Cov}(x)_i | i = 2, 3, \cdots, K\}$$

  - Weight coverage:
    - Sum of the neuron coverage frequency of two neurons that this weight connects

$$\mathrm{CovW}(D^S)_{k,i,j} = \mathrm{Cov}(D^S)_{k-1,i} + \mathrm{Cov}(D^S)_{k,j}$$

- Ordinal score computation
  - Formulation:

$$\mathbf{w}^{ReMoS} = \underset{\mathbf{w} \subset \mathbf{w}^T}{\arg\max}\ ACC(T(\mathbf{w}), D^S) - \sum_{w \in \mathbf{w}} |w|$$

  - To unify the value range

$$ord\_mag_{k,i,j} = rank(|w_{k,i,j}|),$$

$$ord\_cov_{k,i,j} = rank(\mathrm{CovW}(D^S)_{k,i,j})$$

$$ord_{k,i,j} = ord\_cov_{k,i,j} - ord\_mag_{k,i,j}$$

ReMoS approach

- Relevant slice generation
  - Identify which weights should be included based on ordinal scores (t_θ is the slice size, not value size)

$$slice(D^S) = \{w_{k,i,j} | ord_{k,i,j} > t_\theta\}$$

- Fine-tune
  - Traditional fine-tune

$$\begin{cases} \text{Weights inside } slice(D^S)\text{: Fine-tune from teacher} \\ \text{Weights outside } slice(D^S)\text{: Random initialization} \end{cases}$$

- Advantage
  - Less computation overhead: only *forward-pass* using the student dataset once
  - No need to know the student task in advance
  - Agnostic to DNN architectures

Effectiveness

- CV results
  - Better ACC
  - Lower DIR

Sacrifices <2% accuracy and
reduces >75% inherited defects



Adversarial attack



Neuron coverage attack



Backdoor attack

Effectiveness

- NLP results
  - Defect is more severe in NLP
  - Ours is significantly better
  - ReMoS reduces 50% to 61% DIR, only sacrificing 3% acc at most

Adversarial attack

Model	Dataset		Fine-tune	Mag-prune	ReMoS
BERT	SST-2	*ACC*	92.20	93.43	92.03
		DIR	85.30	67.70	62.23
	QNLI	*ACC*	89.42	88.84	88.45
		DIR	74.94	62.11	45.16
RoBERTa	SST-2	*ACC*	94.40	94.06	92.08
		DIR	84.94	58.48	49.46
	QNLI	*ACC*	90.25	91.09	89.60
		DIR	74.02	56.61	36.36
Average Relative Value		$rACC_m$	-	1.00	0.99
		$rDIR_m$	-	0.76	0.60

Backdoor attack

Model		Dataset	Data Poisoning						Weight Poisoning					
			Fine-tune		Mag-prune		ReMoS		Fine-tune		Mag-prune		ReMoS	
			ACC	*DIR*	*ACC*	*DIR*	*ACC*	*DIR*	*ACC*	*DIR*	*ACC*	*DIR*	*ACC*	*DIR*
BERT	FDK	SST-2 to SST-2	94.19	100.00	93.70	100.00	91.27	39.09	93.37	100.00	93.19	98.93	90.92	29.82
		IMDB to IMDB	90.60	93.52	89.54	95.24	85.53	61.73	89.05	96.53	88.76	92.05	87.00	37.72
	DS	SST-2 to IMDB	92.11	99.88	92.27	100.00	90.04	74.67	91.85	100.00	90.82	99.53	87.42	61.48
		IMDB to SST-2	93.52	88.15	92.65	85.26	91.15	27.71	93.85	93.93	93.57	91.21	91.94	21.55
RoBERTa	FDK	SST-2 to SST-2	92.70	100.00	92.35	100.00	91.17	29.82	92.29	100.00	92.44	100.00	90.70	24.94
		IMDB to IMDB	87.96	96.11	88.24	96.15	85.74	70.19	89.34	96.15	89.48	96.09	86.34	85.91
	DS	SST-2 to IMDB	90.53	100.00	91.26	100.00	90.32	24.14	91.67	100.00	91.16	100.00	88.71	30.83
		IMDB to SST-2	93.21	96.17	92.46	96.17	92.17	61.26	92.80	96.22	92.58	96.02	89.95	18.07
Average Relative Value			-	-	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.50	-	-	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.39

Interesting observations

- ***Low-level*** vs. ***high-level layers***
  - Weights from high-level layers are excluded
  - Aligns with DNN transferability [1]



Figure 9: The distribution of weight changes during training.



Figure 10: The magnitude of weights excluded by ReMoS in each layer.

- ***Accuracy*** vs. ***attack tolerance***
  - Seek the balance in real applications



- ***Efficiency***
  - Almost the same as vanilla fine-tuning
  - Design efficient algorithms in the future



[1] Yosinski J, Clune J, Bengio Y, et al. How transferable are features in deep neural networks? NIPS 2014.

Improving Generalization of Adversarial Training

- Adversarial Training (AT) improves adversarial robustness but at the cost of generalization ability.
  - **Robust Critical Fine-Tuning (RiFT)** fine-tunes non-robust critical layer, we improve the generalization while maintain adversarial robustness.



Figure 2. The pipeline of our proposed Robust Critical Fine-Tuning (RiFT).

Kaijie Zhu et al. Improving Generalization of Adversarial Training via Robust Critical Fine-Tuning. ICCV 2023.

Improving Generalization of Adversarial Training

- We verify the effectiveness of RiFT across different networks, datasets, and adversarial training methods.

Architecture	Method	CIFAR10			CIFAR100			Tiny-ImageNet		
		Std	*OOD*	*Adv*	*Std*	*OOD*	*Adv*	*Std*	*OOD*	*Adv*
ResNet18	AT	81.46	73.56	53.63	57.10	46.43	30.15	49.10	27.68	23.28
	AT+RiFT	**83.44**	**75.69**	**53.65**	**58.74**	**48.06**	**30.17**	**50.61**	**28.73**	**23.34**
	Δ	+1.98	+2.13	+0.02	+1.64	+1.63	+0.02	+1.51	+1.05	+0.06
ResNet34	AT	84.23	75.37	55.31	58.67	48.24	30.50	50.96	27.91	24.27
	AT+RiFT	**85.41**	**77.15**	**55.34**	**60.88**	**49.97**	**30.58**	**52.54**	**30.07**	**24.37**
	Δ	+1.18	+1.78	+0.03	+2.21	+1.73	+0.08	+1.58	+2.16	+0.10
WRN34-10	AT	87.41	78.75	55.40	62.35	50.61	**31.66**	52.78	31.81	26.07
	AT+RiFT	**87.89**	**79.31**	**55.41**	**64.56**	**52.69**	31.64	**55.31**	**33.86**	**26.17**
	Δ	+0.48	+0.56	+0.01	+2.21	+2.08	-0.02	+2.53	+2.05	+0.10
Avg	Δ	+1.21	+1.49	+0.02	+2.02	+1.81	+0.02	+1.87	+1.75	+0.08

Table 2. Results of RiFT + other AT methods.

Method	CIFAR10			CIFAR100		
	Std	*OOD*	*Adv*	*Std*	*OOD*	*Adv*
TRADES	81.54	73.42	**53.31**	57.44	47.23	30.20
TRADES+RiFT	**81.87**	**74.09**	53.30	**57.78**	**47.52**	**30.22**
Δ	+0.33	+0.67	-0.01	+0.34	+0.29	+0.02
MART	76.77	68.62	56.90	51.46	42.07	31.47
MART+RiFT	**77.14**	**69.41**	**56.92**	**52.42**	**43.35**	**31.48**
Δ	+0.37	+0.79	+0.02	+0.96	+1.28	+0.01
AWP	78.40	70.48	53.83	52.85	43.10	31.00
AWP+RiFT	**78.79**	**71.12**	**53.84**	**54.89**	**45.08**	**31.05**
Δ	+ 0.39	+0.64	+0.01	+2.04	+1.98	+0.05
SCORE	84.20	75.82	54.59	54.83	45.39	29.49
SCORE+RiFT	**85.65**	**77.37**	**54.62**	**57.63**	**47.77**	**29.50**
Δ	+1.45	+1.55	+0.03	+2.80	+2.38	+0.01

Kaijie Zhu et al. Improving Generalization of Adversarial Training via Robust Critical Fine-Tuning. ICCV 2023.

Adversarial robustness of transformers

- Self-attention (transformers) is the standard model for CV and NLP

$$Attention(Q,K,V) = \mathrm{Softmax}\left(\frac{QK^T}{\sqrt{d}}\right)V$$







- Vaswani A, Shazeer N, Parmar N, et al. Attention is all you need. NIPS 2017.
- Dosovitskiy A, Beyer L, Kolesnikov A, et al. An image is worth 16x16 words: Transformers for image recognition at scale. ICLR 2021.

Self-attention is more robust than LSTM

- Why?
  - Change of a word does not change the attention too much
  - Attention is highly **sparse**

Theorem 1. *Assume $\|\Delta x\| \le \delta$ and $\{x_i\}_{i=1}^n$ are d-dimensional vectors uniformly distributed on the unit sphere, then $E[|s'_{i\bar{j}} - s_{i\bar{j}}|] \le \frac{C\delta}{\sqrt{d}}$ with $C = \|W^Q\|\|W^K\|$ and $P(|s'_{i\bar{j}} - s_{i\bar{j}}| \ge \epsilon) \le \frac{C\delta}{\epsilon\sqrt{d}}$.*

Proof. The value $E[s'_{i\bar{j}} - s_{i\bar{j}}] = E[x_i^T z]$ where $z = W^Q(W^K)^T\Delta x$ is a fixed vector, and it is easy to derive $\|z\| \le \|W^Q\|\|W^K\|\delta$. To bound this expectation, we first try to bound $a_1 = E[x_i^T e_1]$ where $e_1 = [1, 0, \ldots, 0]$. Due to the rotation invariance we can obtain $a_1 = \cdots = a_d$ and $\sum_i a_i^2 = 1$, so $|a_1| = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}}$. This implies $E[x_i^T z] \le \frac{C\delta}{\sqrt{d}}$. Using Markov inequality, we can then find the probability results. □

	Model	
Attack Method	**LSTM**	**BERT**
RANDOM	17.8%	9.2%
LIST	63%	56%
AS_{MIN}-GR	57%	53%
AS_{MAX}-GR	78%	54%
AS_{MIN}-EC	55%	52%
AS_{MAX}-EC	78%	51%
Best attention attack(A_*)	78%	54%
GS-GR	**95%**	**75%**
GS-EC	**95%**	**75%**

On the Robustness of Self-Attentive Models, ACL'19.

Understanding the robustness of Vision Transformers

- Explore different aspects of ViT
  - ViT has better robustness than CNN when there are **larger pre-training data**
  - **Increasing model size** and **reducing patch size** can boost robustness performance
  - Transformer is more robust than CNN w.r.t. adversarial examples with **same training data**
  - ViT is still robust when **removing MLP layer**



Bhojanapalli S, Chakrabarti A, Glasner D, et al. Understanding robustness of transformers for image classification. ICCV 2021.

Intriguing properties of Vision Transformers

- Explore other properties of ViT
  - ViT is more robust to **occulution**: mask 80% can still has 60% accuracy
  - ViT is better at recognizing **shapes** while CNN relies on **textures**
  - Pre-trained ViT is more robust in **zero-shot** and **long-tail** settings
  - ViT is robust to **spatial structure** and **patch order**



ViT is robust to all these scenarios.

Naseer M M, Ranasinghe K, Khan S H, et al. Intriguing properties of vision transformers. NeurIPS 2021.

Other experiments of ViT robustness

- Key takeaways:
  - ViT is more robust than CNN [1]
  - The robustness of ViT is not determined, but controlled by data size and training recipe [2]

Model	# Parameters (Million)	# FLOPS (Million)	ImageNet-A (Top-1 Acc)	ImageNet-R (Top-1 Acc)	ImageNet-O (AUPR)
ResNet-50	25.6138	4144.854528	2.14	25.25	16.76
EfficientV2 (GC)	13.678	1937.974	7.389285	32.701343	20.34
ResNet-L (GE)	31.078	3501.953	5.1157087	29.905242	21.61
ResNet-M (GE)	21.143	3015.121	4.99335	29.345	22.1
ResNet-S (GE)	8.174	749.538	2.4682036	24.96156	17.74
ResNet18 (SK)	11.958	1820.836	1.802681	22.95351	16.71
ResNet34 (SK)	22.282	3674.5	3.4683768	26.77625	18.03
Wide (4x) ResNet-50 (SK)	27.48	4497.133	6.0972147	28.3357	20.58
ViT S/16	**22**	**4608.338304**	**6.39517**	**26.11397**	**22.50**

- [1] Paul S, Chen P Y. Vision transformers are robust learners. AAAI 2022.
- [2] Bai Y, Mei J, Yuille A L, et al. Are transformers more robust than cnns? NeurIPS 2021.
- Aldahdooh A, Hamidouche W, Deforges O. Reveal of vision transformers robustness against adversarial attacks[J]. arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.03734, 2021.

TAG: Gradient Attack on Transformer-based LMs

- Directly use adversarial attack on Transformers



$$(\mathbf{X}^*, \mathbf{Y}^*) = \underset{(\mathbf{X}', \mathbf{Y}')}{\arg\min}\, \mathcal{D}(\nabla\mathbf{W}', \nabla\mathbf{W})$$

$$\mathcal{D}(\nabla\mathbf{W}', \nabla\mathbf{W}) = ||\nabla\mathbf{W}' - \nabla\mathbf{W}||_2 + \alpha(\nabla\mathbf{W})||\nabla\mathbf{W}' - \nabla\mathbf{W}||$$

Deng J, Wang Y, Li J, et al. Tag: Gradient attack on transformer-based language models[J]. arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.06819, 2021.

DBIA: Data-free Backdoor Injection Attack

- Backdoor attack against Transformers
  - Pre-training stage: generate poison data to minimize the distance to pre-trained attention
  - Attack stage: Fine-tune some neurons based on their activation value

$$\min_t \sum_{n=1}^{N} (\text{Attention}(\widetilde{x}_n, L) - \text{taget\_value})$$



Transformers	Before Attack		After Attack					
	CDA	ASR	AR	CDA	ASR-SurD	ASR-RelD	TPR	Time
ViT	80.90%	0.05%	7.20	78.75%	99.98%	79.25%	2.68%	449s
DeiT	82.72%	0.08%	15.16	81.57%	100.00%	97.38%	2.01%	16s
Swin Transformer	82.36%	0.08%	1.38	81.10%	99.15%	98.20%	0.03%	60s

Lv P, Ma H, Zhou J, et al. Dbia: Data-free backdoor injection attack against transformer networks[J]. arXiv preprint arXiv:2111.11870, 2021.

TrojViT: Trojan Insertion in Vision Transformers

- Replace area-wise trigger with patch-wise trigger
  - Distribute triggers to different patches to increase the attack success rate





Models	Clean Model		Backdoored Model				
	CDA (%)	ASR(%)	TAR(%)	CDA(%)	ASR(%)	TPN	TBN
TBT	79.47	0.09	4.59	68.96	94.69	384	1650
Proflip	79.47	0.08	4.59	70.54	95.87	320	1380
DBIA	79.47	0.08	4.59	78.32	97.38	$0.44M$	$1.94M$
BAVT	79.47	0.02	4.59	77.78	61.40	$0.23M$	$0.97M$
DBAVT	79.47	0.05	4.59	77.48	98.53	$0.41M$	$1.76M$
TrojViT	79.47	31.23	4.59	**79.19**	**99.96**	**213**	**880**

Zheng M, Lou Q, Jiang L. Trojvit: Trojan insertion in vision transformers. CVPR 2023.

Improve the robustness of ViT by architecture design

- RVT: robust vision transformer
  - CNN→patch embedding
  - Position embedding: has almost no influence on robustness
  - Transformer block: has almost no influence on robustness
  - Head number: more heads more robustness
  - Feedforward network→Conv FFN
  - Classification token→global average pooling



Model	FLOPs (G)	Params (M)	ImageNet Top-1	ImageNet Top-5	FGSM	PGD	IN-C (↓)	IN-A	IN-R	IN-SK
DeiT-B [40]	17.6	86.6	82.0	95.7	46.4	21.3	48.5	27.4	44.9	32.4
ConViT-B [6]	17.7	86.5	82.4	96.0	45.4	20.8	46.9	29.0	48.4	35.7
Swin-B [25]	15.4	87.8	**83.4**	96.4	49.2	21.3	54.4	**35.8**	46.6	32.4
PVT-Large [43]	9.8	61.4	81.7	95.9	33.1	7.3	59.8	26.6	42.7	30.2
PiT-B [20]	12.5	73.8	82.4	95.7	49.3	23.7	48.2	33.9	43.7	32.3
T2T-ViT_t-24 [51]	15.0	64.1	82.6	96.1	46.7	17.5	48.0	28.9	47.9	35.4
RVT-B	17.7	86.2	82.5	96.0	52.3	27.4	47.3	27.7	48.2	35.8
RVT-B*	17.7	91.8	82.7	**96.5**	**53.0**	**29.9**	**46.8**	28.5	**48.7**	**36.0**

Mao X, Qi G, Chen Y, et al. Towards robust vision transformer. CVPR 2022.

Improve the robustness of ViT by training strategy

- Improved training strategy:
  - Pretraining is helpful
  - Use CutMix and Mixup for data augmentation
  - SGD is better than Adam for optimizers
  - Piece-wise learning rate scheduler is better than cyclic
  - Gradient clipping is helpful



(a) ARD removes the gradients flowing through the multi-head attention modules with probability during the back propagation while keeping forward propagation unchanged.



(b) PRM randomly masks a proportion of perturbation with probability during the forward propagation while keeping backward propagation unchanged.

Model	Method	CIFAR-10					Imagenette				
		Natural	CW-20	PGD-20	PGD-100	AA	Natural	CW-20	PGD-20	PGD-100	AA
DeiT-Ti	TRADES	78.70	46.78	49.63	49.58	46.25	88.00	63.00	62.60	62.40	61.20
	+Ours	**80.24**	**47.60**	**51.02**	**50.97**	**47.02**	**89.00**	**63.20**	**64.40**	**64.00**	**61.80**
	MART	71.7	45.95	49.52	49.37	44.34	80.40	55.40	56.20	56.00	52.60
	+Ours	**74.89**	**47.60**	**51.18**	**51.16**	**45.97**	**86.40**	**61.80**	**63.40**	**63.20**	**62.20**
ConViT-Ti	TRADES	77.70	45.09	48.71	48.63	44.65	83.80	58.80	60.40	60.20	57.80
	+Ours	**80.02**	**47.33**	**50.10**	**50.08**	**46.75**	**89.20**	**66.20**	**65.60**	**65.00**	**64.60**
	+MART	63.68	38.97	42.80	42.77	37.62	61.80	36.40	41.80	41.60	35.40
	+Ours	**74.89**	**47.60**	**51.18**	**51.16**	**45.97**	**88.00**	**65.00**	**64.40**	**64.40**	**63.40**
Swin-Ti	TRADES	79.41	46.45	49.3	49.23	45.74	93.60	73.80	73.40	73.00	72.00
	+Ours	**80.71**	**47.11**	**49.79**	**49.74**	**46.36**	**94.60**	**75.60**	**74.20**	**74.20**	**73.40**
	+MART	75.19	46.10	49.82	49.71	44.54	92.40	71.60	70.20	69.60	68.60
	+Ours	**77.37**	**46.98**	**50.44**	**50.28**	**45.28**	**96.20**	**80.00**	**70.80**	**70.60**	**70.00**

Mo Y, Wu D, Wang Y, et al. When adversarial training meets vision transformers: Recipes from training to architecture. NeurIPS 2022.

Improve the robustness of ViT by regularization

- Robust Vision Transformer
  - Transformer is the key module in today's large models
  - Improve the robustness of ViT can enhance large model robustness
- Recall adversarial training

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}^* = \arg\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\in\mathcal{D}} \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2\leqslant\epsilon} \mathcal{L}\left(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta}), y\right)$$

- Lipschitz continuity

$$\left\|f\left(\mathbf{x}_1\right)-f\left(\mathbf{x}_2\right)\right\|_p \leqslant C\left\|\mathbf{x}_1-\mathbf{x}_2\right\|_p, \quad \forall \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 \in \mathbf{dom} f.$$

How to easily improve the robustness of ViT?

Specformer

- Core idea
  - Self-attention is a linear module; reformulate self-attention as **linear functions**

$$\mathrm{Attn}\left(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{W}^{Q}, \mathbf{W}^{K}, \mathbf{W}^{V}\right)=\operatorname{softmax}\left(\frac{\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{Q}\left(\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{K}\right)^{\top}}{\sqrt{D}}\right)\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{V}$$

$$\mathrm{Attn}\left(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{W}^{Q}, \mathbf{W}^{K}, \mathbf{W}^{V}\right)=\operatorname{softmax}\left(\frac{\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{Q}\left(\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{K}\right)^{\top}}{\sqrt{D}}\right)\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{V}=\operatorname{softmax}\left(\frac{h_1(\mathbf{X})h_2(\mathbf{X})^{\top}}{\sqrt{D}}\right)h_3(\mathbf{X}),$$

where these linear mapping operations are formulated as:

$$h_1(\mathbf{X})=\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{Q},\ h_2(\mathbf{X})=\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{K},\ h_3(\mathbf{X})=\mathbf{X}\mathbf{W}^{V}.$$

Theorem 3.1 (Calculation of Lipschitz constant [18]). *Let $f:\mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ be differentiable and Lipschitz continuous under a choice of p-norm $\|\cdot\|_p$. Let $\mathbf{J}_f(x)$ denote its total derivative (Jacobian) at $\mathbf{x}$. Then,*

$$\mathrm{Lip}_p(f)=\sup_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbb{R}^n}\|\mathbf{J}_f(\mathbf{x})\|_p, \tag{6}$$

where $\|\mathbf{J}_f(\mathbf{x})\|_p$ is the induced operator norm on $\mathbf{J}_f(\mathbf{x})$.

Specformer

- MSVP: maximum singular value penalization
- Power iteration for acceleration



$$\mathcal{J} = \mathcal{L}_{cls} + \mathcal{L}_{msvp} = \mathcal{L}_{cls} + \lambda_q \cdot \sigma^2_{\max}(\mathbf{W}^Q) + \lambda_k \cdot \sigma^2_{\max}(\mathbf{W}^K) + \lambda_v \cdot \sigma^2_{\max}(\mathbf{W}^V)$$

Theorem 3.2 (Control the upper bound of attention mechanism)**.** *We can control the Lipschitz constant of attention layers by controlling the maximum singular values of the* $\mathbf{W}^Q, \mathbf{W}^K, \mathbf{W}^V$*:*

$$\mathrm{Lip}_2(\mathit{Attn}) \leqslant N(N+1)\|\mathbf{W}^Q\|_2\|\mathbf{W}^K\|_2\|\mathbf{W}^{V^\top}\|_2 + N^2\|\mathbf{W}^{V^\top}\|_2. \tag{9}$$

Proof. Proof can be found at Appendix B. □

Hu et al. SpecFormer: Guarding Vision Transformer Robustness through Maximum Singular Value Penalization. In review.

Data quantity: semi-supervised learning

Basics of semi-supervised learning

Advanced algorithms for SSL

SSL **library**, **applications**, and **AI4Science**

Machine Learning (ML) Pipeline

- A Machine Learning (ML) problem consists of 3 parts
  - ML methods – model, algorithm, and evaluation
  - Task – where we apply the model
  - Data – on which we train the model



- Recent success of foundation models demonstrates the importance of high-quality fully-annotated data

High-quality Data is Important

- CLIP [1, 2]
  - 0.4 billion high-quality image-text pairs
  - achieves surprising zero-shot performance
  - 2 billion noisy image-text pairs from web
- SAM [3]
  - 1+ billion masks, 11 million images
  - allows prompting an image to obtain any segmentation mask
- GPT-3 [4]
  - 300 billion high quality tokens
  - supervised instruction tuning with human feedback data -> ChatGPT





1. Alec Radford, et al. Learning transferable visual models from natural language supervision. 2021.
2. Mehdi Cherti, et al. Reproducible scaling laws for contrastive language-image learning. 2022.
3. Alexander Kirillov, et al. Segment anything. 2023.
4. Tom Brown, et al. Language models are few-shot learners. 2020.

Semi-supervised learning



- Research background
  - Learn a generalized model by relying on a small amount of labeled data
- Problem
  - How to guarantee that knowledge can seamlessly transfer from labeled to unlabeled data?
  - Transfer criterion: a *fixed* threshold by Google's FixMatch[NeurIPS'20]

$$\frac{1}{\mu B}\sum_{b=1}^{\mu B}\mathbb{1}(\max(p_m(y|\omega(u_b)))>\boxed{\tau})H(\hat{p}_m(y|\omega(u_b)),p_m(y|\Omega(u_b)))$$



- Research challenge
  - Is the pre-defined fixed threshold for semi-supervised learning enough?
  - Can design better thresholding for semi-supervised learning?

Theory

- We derive a theoretical motivation for low-resource learning
  - Different class should have different and changing thresholds

Theorem 2.1. *For a binary classification problem as mentioned above, the pseudo label Y_p has the following probability distribution:*

$$
\begin{aligned}
P(Y_p = 1) &= \frac{1}{2}\Phi\Big(\frac{\frac{\mu_2-\mu_1}{2} - \frac{1}{\beta}\log(\frac{\tau}{1-\tau})}{\sigma_2}\Big) + \frac{1}{2}\Phi\Big(\frac{\frac{\mu_1-\mu_2}{2} - \frac{1}{\beta}\log(\frac{\tau}{1-\tau})}{\sigma_1}\Big),\\
P(Y_p = -1) &= \frac{1}{2}\Phi\Big(\frac{\frac{\mu_2-\mu_1}{2} - \frac{1}{\beta}\log(\frac{\tau}{1-\tau})}{\sigma_1}\Big) + \frac{1}{2}\Phi\Big(\frac{\frac{\mu_1-\mu_2}{2} - \frac{1}{\beta}\log(\frac{\tau}{1-\tau})}{\sigma_2}\Big),\\
P(Y_p = 0) &= 1 - P(Y_p = 1) - P(Y_p = -1),
\end{aligned}
\tag{3}
$$

where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Moreover, $P(Y_p = 0)$ increases as $\mu_2 - \mu_1$ gets smaller.

Algorithm: FlexMatch

- Fixed vs. flexible threshold
  - We should learn different thresholds for different classes



FlexMatch

- Our proposal: FlexMatch
  - Different for different classes → per-class *adaptation*
  - Lower down thresholds for hard-to-learn classes → encourage *difficult* classes
  - Raise thresholds if already well-learned → keep strict to ensure final acc
  - Dynamically adjusted for every class at every time step → automate the process

Algorithm: FlexMatch

- Technical details
  - A *curriculum pseudo labeling (CPL)* strategy that gradually learn the difficulties of classes
  - Cluster assumption: The learning effect of a class can be reflected by the number of samples whose predictions fall above the high fixed threshold and into this class.

$$\sigma_t(c) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \mathbb{1}(\max(p_{m,t}(y|u_n)) > \tau) \cdot \mathbb{1}(\arg\max(p_{m,t}(y|u_n)) = c).$$

$$\beta_t(c) = \frac{\boxed{\sigma_t(c)}}{\max\left\{\max\limits_c \sigma_t, N - \sum\limits_c \sigma_t\right\}},$$

Warm-up&Norm

$$\mathcal{T} \xrightarrow{\text{Flexible}} \mathcal{T}_t(c) = \boxed{a_t(c)} \cdot \tau \xrightarrow{\text{Warm-up}} \mathcal{T}_t(c) = \boxed{\mathcal{M}}(\boxed{\beta_t(c)}) \cdot \tau,$$

$$\mathcal{M}(x) = \frac{x}{2-x}$$

Mapping function

FlexMatch results

Dataset	CIFAR-10			CIFAR-100			STL-10			SVHN	
Label Amount	40	250	4000	400	2500	10000	40	250	1000	40	1000
PL	74.61±0.26	46.49±2.20	15.08±0.19	87.45±0.85	57.74±0.28	36.55±0.24	74.68±0.99	55.45±2.43	32.64±0.71	64.61±5.60	**9.40**±0.32
Flex-PL	**73.74**±1.96	**46.14**±1.81	**14.75**±0.19	**85.72**±0.46	**56.12**±0.51	**35.60**±0.15	**73.42**±2.19	**52.06**±2.50	**32.05**±0.37	**63.21**±3.64	12.05±0.54
UDA	10.62±3.75	5.16±0.06	4.29±0.07	46.39±1.59	27.73±0.21	22.49±0.23	37.42±8.44	9.72±1.15	6.64±0.17	5.12±4.27	**1.89**±0.01
Flex-UDA	**5.44**±0.52	**5.02**±0.07	**4.24**±0.06	**45.17**±1.88	**27.08**±0.15	**21.91**±0.10	**29.53**±2.10	**9.03**±0.45	**6.10**±0.25	**3.42**±1.51	2.02±0.05
FixMatch	7.47±0.28	**4.86**±0.05	4.21±0.08	46.42±0.82	28.03±0.16	22.20±0.12	35.97±4.14	9.81±1.04	6.25±0.33	**3.81**±1.18	**1.96**±0.03
FlexMatch	**4.97**±0.06	4.98±0.09	**4.19**±0.01	**39.94**±1.62	**26.49**±0.20	**21.90**±0.15	**29.15**±4.16	**8.23**±0.39	**5.77**±0.18	8.19±3.20	6.72±0.30
Fully-Supervised	4.62± 0.05			19.30± 0.09			-			2.13± 0.02	

- Significant improvement with **limited labels.**
- Significant improvement with **complicated tasks.**
- Significant improvement on **convergence speed**.
- **No new hyperparameter** introduced.
- **No additional computation** introduced.

Table 2: Error rate results on ImageNet after 2^{20} iterations.

Method	Top-1	Top-5
FixMatch	43.66	21.80
FlexMatch	**41.85**	**19.48**

- B. Zhang et al. Flexmatch: Boosting semi-supervised learning with curriculum pseudo labeling. NeurIPS 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.08263

Algorithm: FreeMatch

- FreeMatch: self-adaptive threshold adjusting scheme
  - Adjusting the threshold in an adaptive manner
  - Global threshold:

$$\tau_t = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{C}, & \text{if } t = 0, \\ \lambda \tau_{t-1} + (1-\lambda)\frac{1}{\mu B}\sum_{b=1}^{\mu B} \max(q_b), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Local threshold:

$$\tilde{p}_t(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{C}, & \text{if } t = 0, \\ \lambda \tilde{p}_{t-1}(c) + (1-\lambda)\frac{1}{\mu B}\sum_{b=1}^{\mu B} q_b(c), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

  - Better than FlexMatch, esp. extreme labeled case (5.8%+ for 1 label per class)

Dataset	CIFAR-10				CIFAR-100			SVHN			STL-10	
# Label	10	40	250	4000	400	2500	10000	40	250	1000	40	1000
Π Model (2015)	79.18±1.11	74.34±1.76	46.24±1.29	13.13±0.59	86.96±0.80	58.80±0.66	36.65±0.00	67.48±0.95	13.30±1.12	7.16±0.11	74.31±0.85	32.78±0.40
Pseudo Label (2013)	80.21±0.55	74.61±0.26	46.49±2.20	15.08±0.19	87.45±0.85	57.74±0.28	36.55±0.24	64.61±5.6	15.59±0.95	9.40±0.32	74.68±0.99	32.64±0.71
VAT (2018)	79.81±1.17	74.66±2.12	41.03±1.79	10.51±0.12	85.20±1.40	46.84±0.79	32.14±0.19	74.75±3.38	4.33±0.12	4.11±0.20	74.74±0.38	37.95±1.12
Mean Teacher (2017)	76.37±0.44	70.09±1.60	37.46±3.30	8.10±0.21	81.11±1.44	45.17±1.06	31.75±0.23	36.09±3.98	3.45±0.03	3.27±0.05	71.72±1.45	33.90±1.37
UDA (2020a)	34.53±10.69	10.62±3.75	5.16±0.06	4.29±0.07	46.39±1.59	27.73±0.21	22.49±0.23	5.12±4.27	**1.92**±0.05	**1.89**±0.01	37.42±8.44	6.64±0.17
FixMatch (2020)	24.79±7.65	7.47±0.28	**4.86**±0.05	4.21±0.08	46.42±0.82	28.03±0.16	22.20±0.12	3.81±1.18	2.02±0.02	1.96±0.03	35.97±4.14	6.25±0.33
Dash (2021)	27.28±14.09	8.93±3.11	5.16±0.23	4.36±0.11	44.82±0.96	27.15±0.22	21.88±0.07	2.19±0.18	2.04±0.02	1.97±0.01	34.52±4.30	6.39±0.56
MPL (2021)	23.55±6.01	6.62±0.91	5.76±0.24	4.55±0.04	46.26±1.84	27.71±0.19	21.74±0.09	9.33±8.02	2.29±0.04	2.28±0.02	35.76±4.83	6.66±0.00
FlexMatch (2021)	13.85±12.04	4.97±0.06	4.98±0.09	4.19±0.01	39.94±1.62	26.49±0.20	21.90±0.15	8.19±3.20	6.59±2.29	6.72±0.30	29.15±4.16	5.77±0.18
FreeMatch	**8.07**±4.24	**4.90**±0.04	4.88±0.18	**4.10**±0.02	**37.98**±0.42	**26.47**±0.20	**21.68**±0.03	**1.97**±0.02	1.97±0.01	1.96±0.03	**15.56**±0.55	**5.63**±0.15
Fully-Supervised	4.62±0.05				19.30±0.09			2.13±0.01			-	

Table 2. Error rates and running time on ImageNet (100k labels).

	Top1	Top5	Running Time (s/iter.)
FixMatch	43.66	21.80	**0.4**
FlexMatch	41.85	19.48	0.6
FreeMatch	**40.57**	**18.77**	**0.4**



Y. Wang et al. FreeMatch: self-adaptive thresholding for semi-supervised learning. ICLR 2023.

Imprecise Label Learning: A Unified Framework

- Acquiring *fully-annotated* data with *precise labels* is a challenging and long-standing problem in ML
  - expensive, laborious, time-consuming, error-prone
- Resulting in various types of *imprecise/limited labels* in reality
  - multiple candidate labels, noisy labels, fully unlabeled data
- Each individual type/combination of types of imprecise labels require *different learning paradigm*
  - semi-supervised learning, partial label learning, noisy label learning, partial noisy label learning, etc.





Hao C, et al. Imprecise Label Learning: A Unified Framework for Learning with Various Imprecise Label Configurations. Arxiv 2305.12715, 2023.

Imprecise Label Learning: A Unified Framework

- We propose *the first unified framework* for learning with various imprecise labels
  - X – represents input features
  - Y – represents precise labels, treated as unknown
  - I – represents abstract imprecise label information



- Maximum Likelihood Estimation of $P(X, I; \theta)$
  - $\theta^* = \arg\max_{\theta} \log P(X, I; \theta) = \arg\max_{\theta} \log \sum_{Y} P(X, Y, I; \theta)$
  - can be iteratively solved with *Expectation-Maximization (EM)* algorithr
  - $$\begin{aligned} \theta^{t+1} &= \arg\max_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{Y|X,I;\theta^t} [\log P(X, Y, I; \theta)] \\ &= \arg\max_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{Y|X,I;\theta^t} [\log P(Y \mid X; \theta) + \log P(I \mid X, Y; \theta)] \end{aligned}$$

Imprecise Label

Method	q	CIFAR-10, l=50000			q	CIFAR-100, l=50000		
		η=0.1	η=0.2	η=0.3		η=0.1	η=0.2	η=0.3
PiCO+ [63]	0.1	93.64	93.13	92.18	0.01	71.42	70.22	66.14
IRNet [47]		93.44	92.57	92.38		71.17	70.10	68.77
DALI [44]		94.15	94.04	93.77		72.26	71.98	71.04
PiCO+ Mixup [44]		94.58	94.74	94.43		75.04	74.31	71.79
DALI Mixup [44]		95.83	95.86	95.75		76.52	76.55	76.09
Ours		**96.47**$\pm$0.11	**96.09**$\pm$0.20	**95.83**$\pm$0.05		**77.53**$\pm$0.24	**76.96**$\pm$0.02	**76.43**$\pm$0.27
PiCO+ [63]	0.3	92.32	92.22	89.95	0.05	69.40	66.67	62.24
IRNet [47]		92.81	92.18	91.35		70.73	69.33	68.09
DALI [44]		93.44	93.25	92.42		72.28	71.35	70.05
PiCO+ Mixup [44]		94.02	94.03	92.94		73.06	71.37	67.56
DALI Mixup [44]		95.52	95.41	94.67		76.87	75.23	74.49
Ours		**96.2**$\pm$0.02	**95.87**$\pm$0.14	**95.22**$\pm$0.06		**77.07**$\pm$0.16	**76.34**$\pm$0.08	**75.13**$\pm$0.63

- Naturally extend to mixture of any imprecise labels
  - first work not only comparable to SOTA methods in each setting
  - but also outperforms previous sophisticatedly designed methods for mixture

Hao C, et al. Imprecise Label Learning: A Unified Framework for Learning with Various Imprecise Label Configurations. Arxiv 2305.12715, 2023.

Code library: From TorchSSL to USB

- TorchSSL

TORCHSSL

TorchSSL/TorchSSL Public

A PyTorch-based library for semi-supervised learning (NeurIPS'21)

Python 902 149

Supported algorithms: In addition to fully-supervised (as a baseline), TorchSSL supports the following popular algorithms:

1. PiModel (NeurIPS 2015) [1]
2. MeanTeacher (NeurIPS 2017) [2]
3. PseudoLabel (ICML 2013) [3]
4. VAT (Virtual adversarial training, TPAMI 2018) [4]
5. MixMatch (NeurIPS 2019) [5]
6. UDA (Unsupervised data augmentation, NeurIPS 2020) [6]
7. ReMixMatch (ICLR 2019) [7]
8. FixMatch (NeurIPS 2020) [8]
9. FlexMatch (NeurIPS 2021) [9]

Besides, we implement our Curriculum Pseudo Labeling (CPL) method for Pseudo-Label (Flex-Pseudo-Label) and UDA (Flex-UDA).

Supported datasets: TorchSSL currently supports 5 popular datasets in SSL research:

1. CIFAR-10
2. CIFAR-100
3. STL-10
4. SVHN
5. ImageNet

https://github.com/TorchSSL/TorchSSL

279 GPU days → 37 GPU days

- USB

USB
Unified SSL Benchmark

  - A unified semi-supervised learning benchmark
  - More applications, tasks, datasets, and algorithms!☺
  - CV, NLP, and Audio☺
  - More friendly to small groups
    - You may not need many GPUs☺
  - Unified benchmark results
  - ‘`pip install semilearn`’ ☺
  - APIs, docs, and tutorials☺

https://usb.readthedocs.io
https://github.com/microsoft/Semi-supervised-learning
https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.07204

Application: different downstream tasks

- Semi-supervised learning
  - Pre-trained models cannot perform well
  - SSL algorithms can greatly improve their performance in this scenario
  - Especially on **difficult** tasks with **extremely limited** labels







Summary of robustness

- About robustness research:
  - Data quality: Transformer robustness is important and still in infancy
  - Data quantity: Pay attention to semi-supervised learning in downstream applications